Flux continu

The ecological concept of human carrying capacity is necessarily complicated because human beings are the ‘ultimate ecosystem engineers’ who moderate the environment for their benefit. For at least the last few hundred years, human ingenuity, access to massive stocks of fossil fuels, and technological development have driven facilitation whereby increasing human abundance has promoted higher population growth rates. However, this positive relationship broke down during the 1950s, and by 1962, the global human population entered a phase where the growth rate consistently declined as population increased. The onset of this negative phase occurred 8 years before a global biocapacity deficit began in 1970. The onset of the negative phase also varies regionally, with the lowest-income and highest fertility regions entering this phase later than higher-income regions. A Ricker logistic model fitted to the negative phase predicts that the global population could reach 11.7–12.4 billion people between 2067 and 2076.

La course effrénée à la croissance ne convainc pas tous les entrepreneurs. Les sceptiques ? Les micro-entreprises, cœur du tissu économique français. Une étude met en lumière les raisons qui poussent certaines entreprises à ne pas croître.

The concepts of Green Growth and Degrowth represent two major narratives in the public and academic debate on socio-ecological transformation. . . Using a comparative analysis of the two research fields, we confirm several findings from previous reviews, including that Green Growth research is highly policy oriented, focuses on practical implementation and builds on empirical research methods, while Degrowth research is highly theory-driven, focuses on the analysis of complex human-nature interrelationships and builds on a sound theoretical and conceptual foundation. Our analysis further reveals that Green Growth and Degrowth are two rather isolated fields of research with little exchange and mutual reference on related topics. However, the topic of social change and transition represents an intersecting and promising future research area. . . .

Global energy and materials are essential to the functioning of the economy and have significant implications for macroeconomics and the environment. At the same time, the world is not on track to meet Paris Agreement goals. This paper documents two stylized facts that connect these observations. First, the world economy is characterized by large embedded emissions and materials: different energies and materials are deeply entwined and interdependent. This has historically led to additive – rather than substitution – dynamics in energy and materials on a global scale. Second, historically there has been a strong positive correlation between efficiency in resource use and total resource use at a global scale. We synthesize these observations by introducing the Generalized Jevons Paradox (GJP). We argue that the GJP reflects the direct and indirect energy/material demand effects of long-term energy and material interdependencies, themselves shaped by market and geoeconomic power, trade arrangements, and financi

New research shows major lenders are accelerating their investment in Big Oil as the industry turns toward plastics and petrochemicals.

For most of the modern era, capitalism justified itself through growth. Industrial societies converted vast amounts of fossil energy into production, wealth, and rising living standards. Roads, bridges, power grids, schools, and public institutions expanded alongside the economy. Inequality and exploitation remained deeply embedded in the system, but they were partly obscured by a broader story of material progress.

Our roadmap has been shaped by experts across the world, from UN agencies to grassroots movements. We call on political leaders at all levels to use it

Il y a 50 ans Dennis Meadows co-publiait le rapport « Meadows » (oui c’est bien lui !). Ce rapport est aussi appelé rapport du Club de Rome, ou «The limits to growth ». Il dit en bref qu’une croissance infinie dans un monde fini n’est pas possible et que tôt ou tard, nous allons atteindre des limites physiques et commencer à décroître. Et d’après les modélisations de l’époque, ce « tôt ou tard » arrive autour de 2030… Cela fait 50 ans que les conclusions de ces travaux sont discutées et débattues, mais aussi 50 ans que la modélisation informatique de l’époque fonctionne, que nous suivons la trajectoire anticipée à peu de choses près. Alors que nous parlons de pic pétrole, de risques d’approvisionnements en métaux rares, de la nécessité de diminuer rapidement nos émissions, que la croissance économique ne semble plus reposer que sur de la dette, bref, alors que nous semblons atteindre les limites à la fois de notre planète, de nos ressources et de notre capacité à croitre, ce fameux rapport revient sur le deva

Current energy projections often envision an expansion of nuclear capacities to decarbonize future energy systems. However, this contrasts with the historic and current status of the nuclear industry, marked by techno-economic challenges for both light-water and non-light-water reactor technologies. Regardless, projections of strong nuclear growth have persisted since the 1970s. This paper investigates the “nuclear energy paradox” which shows the recurring divergence between historical projections and actual developments. A data compilation of long-term energy projections from international organizations such as the IAEA and the IEA as well as energy system models like GCAM and MESSAGE, as used in the IPCC, reveal a recurring pattern of high-growth projections for nuclear power. Such projections often rest on techno-economic assumptions such as substantial cost reductions. We propose the concept of nuclear imaginaries to show that these assumptions are embedded into techno-economic visions of nuclear power de

Rights-based, post-growth policies that make poverty eradication a deliberate outcome of restructured economies — not a trickle-down side effect of destructive growth.