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Current energy projections often envision an expansion of nuclear capacities to decarbonize future energy systems. However, this contrasts with the historic and current status of the nuclear industry, marked by techno-economic challenges for both light-water and non-light-water reactor technologies. Regardless, projections of strong nuclear growth have persisted since the 1970s. This paper investigates the “nuclear energy paradox” which shows the recurring divergence between historical projections and actual developments. A data compilation of long-term energy projections from international organizations such as the IAEA and the IEA as well as energy system models like GCAM and MESSAGE, as used in the IPCC, reveal a recurring pattern of high-growth projections for nuclear power. Such projections often rest on techno-economic assumptions such as substantial cost reductions. We propose the concept of nuclear imaginaries to show that these assumptions are embedded into techno-economic visions of nuclear power de

This article examines the technocentric bias that characterizes climate mitigation literature, focusing on the reports of the IPCC's Working Group III. This bias stems from structural features of the scientific field that prioritizes innovation, leading to the overrepresentation of technological solutions in climate research. Funding mechanisms further reinforce this tendency by incentivizing collaboration with industrial R&D, creating a self-reinforcing loop in which scientific authority and industrial interests converge. The IPCC's institutional positioning—as a policy-relevant yet politically cautious body—amplifies this dynamic by favoring allegedly “cost-effective” technological pathways that lack practical feasibility.

Critical minerals, which are essential for a range of energy technologies and for the broader economy, have become a major focus in global policy and trade discussions. Price volatility, supply chain bottlenecks and geopolitical concerns make the regular monitoring of their supply and demand extremely vital.

L'agriculture face au réchauffement climatique et aux pertes de biodiversité : les apports de la science - Compte rendu de l'audition publique du 20 février 2025 et de la présentation des conclusions du 3 avril 2025

Some narratives in international development hold that ending poverty and achieving good lives for all will require every country to reach the levels of GDP per capita that currently characterise high-income countries. However, this would require increasing total global output and resource use several times over, dramatically exacerbating ecological breakdown. Furthermore, universal convergence along these lines is unlikely within the imperialist structure of the existing world economy. Here we demonstrate that this dilemma can be resolved with a different approach, rooted in recent needs-based analyses of poverty and development. Strategies for development should not pursue capitalist growth and increased aggregate production as such, but should rather increase the specific forms of production that are necessary to improve capabilities and meet human needs at a high standard, while ensuring universal access to key goods and services through public provisioning and decommodification. At the same time, in high

Evidence shows a continuing increase in the frequency and severity of global heatwaves1,2, raising concerns about the future impacts of climate change and the associated socioeconomic costs3,4. Here we develop a disaster footprint analytical framework by integrating climate, epidemiological and hybrid input–output and computable general equilibrium global trade models to estimate the midcentury socioeconomic impacts of heat stress. We consider health costs related to heat exposure, the value of heat-induced labour productivity loss and indirect losses due to economic disruptions cascading through supply chains. Here we show that the global annual incremental gross domestic product loss increases exponentially from 0.03 ± 0.01 (SSP 245)–0.05 ± 0.03 (SSP 585) percentage points during 2030–2040 to 0.05 ± 0.01–0.15 ± 0.04 percentage points during 2050–2060. By 2060, the expected global economic losses reach a total of 0.6–4.6% with losses attributed to health loss (37–45%), labour productivity loss (18–37%) and i

Flash drought, characterized by unusually rapid drying, can have substantial impact on many socioeconomic sectors, particularly agriculture. However, potential changes to flash drought risk in a warming climate remain unknown. In this study, projected changes in flash drought frequency and cropland risk from flash drought are quantified using global climate model simulations. We find that flash drought occurrence is expected to increase globally among all scenarios, with the sharpest increases seen in scenarios with higher radiative forcing and greater fossil fuel usage. Flash drought risk over cropland is expected to increase globally, with the largest increases projected across North America (change in annual risk from 32% in 2015 to 49% in 2100) and Europe (32% to 53%) in the most extreme emissions scenario. Following low-end and medium scenarios compared to high-end scenarios indicates a notable reduction in annual flash drought risk over cropland. Flash droughts are projected to become more frequent unde

Cela fait des décennies que l’on s’inquiète de la déplétion des ressources notamment minérales, depuis le rapport Meadows. Plus récemment les travaux d’Ugo Bardi avec sa courbe de Sénèque ont attiré l’attention sur la contradiction entre les besoins en métaux de la transition énergétique et l’état des ressources naturelles exploitables....

Metals will play a central role in successfully building Europe’s clean technology value chains and meeting the EU’s 2050 climate-neutrality goal. In the wake of supply disruptions from the COVID-19 pandemic and Russia's invasion of Ukraine, Europe’s lack of resilience for its growing metals needs has become a strategic concern. This study evaluates how Europe can fulfil its goal of “achieving resource security” and “reducing strategic dependencies” for its energy transition metals, through a demand, supply, and sustainability assessment of the EU Green Deal and its resource needs . It concludes that Europe has a window of opportunity to lay the foundation for a higher level of strate- gic autonomy and sustainability for its strategic metals through optimised recycling, domestic value chain investment, and more active global sourcing. But firm action is needed soon to avoid bottlenecks for several materials that risk being in global short supply at the end of this decade.

Une innovation low-tech ? Quel est cet étrange oxymore ? Faut-il retourner à la bougie ou à l’âge des cavernes au lieu de miser sur le progrès technologique ? Certes, le low-tech ne fait pas rêver comme le high-tech et ses applications futuristes. Et pourtant, si c’était là que se situait la vraie modernité et le courage d’innover ?

Métaux rares, substances indispensables à la transition, exploitation zéro émission, techniques minières modernes, technologies intelligentes, impacts positifs sur la biodiversité, standards internationaux contraignants, nouvelles frontières extractives... Ces nouveaux concepts sont de plus en plus mis en avant tant dans l'espace public que dans les espaces plus spécialisés des géosciences et de l'industrie minérale. Pourtant sur le terrain, rien ne change.

La ou les low-tech, mot à mot basses technologies, ou technologies « appropriées » sont un ensemble de technologies et de logiques visant la durabilité forte, la résilience collective et la transformation culturelle1.

An extreme technologically adapted future has not been defined in the literature. Such a future could be argued to be morally justifiable.However, a highly technologically mediated relationship with the biosphere introduces unique risks. These are likely to endanger humanity and future Earth-originating life-forms as well as creating moral hazard. An extreme technologically adapted future is therefore undesirable compared to restabilising the biosphere.

Déployer la sobriété numérique - résumé aux décideurs […] Contexte : le numérique, une transition à repenser

intéressons-nous plus aux technologies hydrogène. Ces dernières s’intègrent en fait dans des véhicules qui ont un moteur électrique – pas d’essence ou de diesel dans le réservoir – mais avec un rayon de déplacement et un temps de recharge similaire à ce que nous connaissons avec nos moteurs traditionnels.

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Une innovation low-tech ? Quel est cet étrange oxymore ? Faut-il retourner à la bougie ou à l’âge des cavernes au lieu de miser sur le progrès technologique ? Certes, le low-tech ne fait pas rêver comme le high-tech et ses applications futuristes. Et pourtant, si c’était là que se situait la vraie modernité et le courage d’innover ?

Freshwater availability is changing worldwide. Here we quantify 34 trends in terrestrial water storage observed by the Gravity Recovery and Climate Experiment (GRACE) satellites during 2002–2016 and categorize their drivers as natural interannual variability, unsustainable groundwater consumption, climate change or combinations thereof. Several of these trends had been lacking thorough investigation and attribution, including massive changes in northwestern China and the Okavango Delta. Others are consistent with climate model predictions. This observation-based assessment of how the world’s water landscape is responding to human impacts and climate variations provides a blueprint for evaluating and predicting emerging threats to water and food security. Analysis of 2002–2016 GRACE satellite observations of terrestrial water storage reveals substantial changes in freshwater resources globally, which are driven by natural and anthropogenic climate variability and human activities.

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L’accélération de l’industrialisation et du développement économique mondial est illustrée par la croissance exponentielle de tous les indicateurs de l’activité humaine, de la prospérité et des impacts environnementaux depuis un siècle (Steffen et al., 2014). La population mondiale et sa proportion urbaine, le revenu et le niveau de vie moyen, la consommation en énergie et en matières premières montrent les mêmes tendances