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Today, we are close to the critical moment when conventional economic growth becomes impossible on a finite planet, constrained by two parallel factors: resource depletion and pollution. Tthe depletion of fossil fuels and other mineral commodities is placing heavy constraints on both industrial and agricultural production. We are not running out of anything yet, but the cost of extraction is increasing, just as the damage that extraction causes to the ecosystem. On the other side, pollution is appearing in more than one form. Chemical pollution is growing in terms of heavy metals, endocrine-disruptors, and other poisoning substances, while climate change can be seen as another form of pollution generated by the excess of CO2 in the atmosphere.

Voici un article véritablement fascinant sur les origines physiques de la crise au Venezuela et une explication des raisons pour lesquelles il était dans l’intérêt des États-Unis de mener une guerre économique afin de prendre le contrôle des réserves pétrolières vénézuéliennes, à un moment où la rentabilité du pétrole américain était en déclin.

Much of today's sustainability discourse emphasizes efficiency, clean technologies, and smart systems, but largely underestimates fundamental physical constraints relating to energy-matter interactions. These constraints stem from the fact that Earth is a materially closed yet energetically open system, driven by the sustained but low power-density flux of solar radiation. This Perspective reframes sustainability within these axiomatic limits, integrating relevant timescales and orders of magnitude. We argue that fossil-fueled industrial metabolism is inherently incompatible with long-term viability, while post-fossil systems are surface-, materials-, and power-intensive. Long-term sustainability must therefore be defined not only by how much energy or material is used, but also by how it is used: favoring organic, carbon-based chemistry with limited reliance on purified metals, operating at low power density, and maintaining low throughput rates. Achieving this requires radical technological shifts toward l

The growth rate of greenhouse gas (GHG) climate forcing increased rapidly in the last 15 years to about 0.5 W/m2 per decade, as shown by the “colorful chart” for GHG climate forcing that we have been publishing for 25 years (Fig. 1).[1] The chart is not in IPCC reports, perhaps because it reveals inconvenient facts. Although growth of GHG climate forcing declined rapidly after the 1987 Montreal Protocol, other opportunities to decrease climate forcing were missed. If policymakers do not appreciate the significance of present data on changing climate forcings, we scientists must share the blame.

Politici ratelen tijdens verkiezingsbijeenkomsten of in interviews vaak over het belang van economische groei voor onze welvaartsstaat. Maar, voor wie groeit onze economie precies? Deze complexe vraag proberen Anuna De Wever en Lena Hartog te beantwoorden in hun nieuwe film ‘The Cost of Growth’.

In a selective history of the evolution of the degrowth movement, his chapter in the Routledge Handbook of Degrowth (2025) offers a collective and subjective reflection revealing tensions between academics, practitioners and activists. Its four co-authors have lived in and with these tensions, analysing practical experiences in the degrowth cooperative Cargonomia (Budapest, Hungary) and the low-tech ecosystem Can Decreix (Cerbère, France). The chapter aims to launch a formal, respectful and significant dialogue between degrowth academics and practitioners. How did an initial public perception of degrowth as activists who experiment-by-doing based in a radical epistemological critique of traditional academia evolve more and more into an academia-dominated movement? We reflect on the movement’s organisation to suggest how deeper collaborative relationships between researchers, activism and practitioners might strengthen degrowth as an academic field, enhance the credibility and robustness of grounded prefigurat

We are an international group of researchers and practitioners interested in the emerging fields of post-growth and ecological macroeconomics. Our aim is to advance economic theory, methodology and policy in order to adequately address some of the biggest challenges of our time: climate change, rising inequality, and financial instability.

Four Prime Ministers in twelve months. Social protests in the streets. Extreme parties rising in the polls. President Macron, once seen as Europe's great reformer, seems politically finished. But what if France's paralysis is not an exception - what if it shows Europe's future?

Chapter 5 in the Routledge Handbook of Degrowth (2025) sketches the French origins of, and approaches to, décroissance. In France, décroissance emerged early – as part of the long history of debates on the industrialisation of the world and its impacts, and of a shorter history of political ecology over the last half-century. Although inspired by a long genealogy questioning the Western industrial trajectory, the word décroissance really came to the fore in the French protest and intellectual scene in 2002, with a convergence between anti-development and anti-advertising movements. Even if degrowth as a slogan and as a movement only emerged recently, its origins, influences, pioneers, pillars and debates were already very strong in the 1970s. After a long hiatus in the 1980s and 1990s, the term décroissance spread spectacularly, entering the political and activist arena at the beginning of the 21st century, designating a sub-group of political ecologists committed to criticising economic development as the do

Je n’aurais jamais pensé écrire une réponse à Serge Latouche, l’un des pionniers de la décroissance.[1] Et pourtant, cela me parait nécessaire tant ses propos envers les degrowth studies sont problématiques.[2] Celui que l’on surnomme « le pape de la décroissance » n’aime pas la littérature anglophone (assez paradoxal d’ailleurs pour quelqu’un qui ne lit presque pas l’anglais). Un « recyclage médiatique » par des « universitaires opportunistes », un « vocable globish discutable » par des jeunes qui « n’ont pas la radicalité de la décroissance » et qui inventent des « monstruosité conceptuelles ». Dans son dernier texte, je suis personnellement attaqué, décrit comme un « rénovateur de la seconde génération », un économiste à la pensée étroite cherchant la célébrité en dénaturant la décroissance.

Identifying the socio-economic drivers behind greenhouse gas emissions is crucial to design mitigation policies. Existing studies predominantly analyze short-term CO2 emissions from fossil fuels, neglecting long-term trends and other GHGs. We examine the drivers of all greenhouse gas emissions between 1820–2050 globally and regionally. The Industrial Revolution triggered sustained emission growth worldwide—initially through fossil fuel use in industrialized economies but also as a result of agricultural expansion and deforestation. Globally, technological innovation and energy mix changes prevented 31 (17–42) Gt CO2e emissions over two centuries. Yet these gains were dwarfed by 81 (64–97) Gt CO2e resulting from economic expansion, with regional drivers diverging sharply: population growth dominated in Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa, while rising affluence was the main driver of emissions elsewhere. Meeting climate targets now requires the carbon intensity of GDP to decline 3 times faster than the global

This brief introduces degrowth – intentional downscaling of the global economy to achieve ecological sustainability and social justice – for people working in environmental and social advocacy. It centers the question: “Has the economy outgrown the planet?” because global ecological limits have reshaped the conditions under which we pursue climate action, environmental justice, and many other pressing aims.

The growth in US power demand is surging to its highest rate in decades, driven first by the electrification of oil and gas production and then by the build out of data centers. While still below the 5-10% growth seen in China, the world’s first “electrostate," the US power sector is experiencing rapid structural growth. The country is delivering more than a 3.5% annual power demand growth rate for the first time in several decades, potentially positioning the US as the world’s next “electrostate,” despite the strong oil and gas focus of the Trump administration.

J’ai l’habitude de voir les écologistes et les futurologues parler des limites de la croissance (« The Limits to Growth »). Je suis moins habitué à voir des spécialistes de l’investissement mentionner des recherches liées aux limites de la croissance. C’est pourtant ce qu’a fait récemment Joachim Klement dans sa lettre d’information quotidienne. Bien entendu, quiconque écrit sur les limites de la croissance doit d’abord procéder à toutes les vérifications d’usage. En effet, la combinaison des mots « limites » et « croissance » dans le titre a suscité un grand nombre de réactions critiques, allant de la déformation pure et simple de l’ouvrage à l’incompréhension du modèle de dynamique des systèmes qui le sous-tend.

I’m used to environmentalists and futurists writing about The Limits to Growth. I’m less used to seeing investment writers mention research that’s linked to The Limits of Growth. But that’s what Joachim Klement did in his daily newsletter recently.