English references

The ecological concept of human carrying capacity is necessarily complicated because human beings are the ‘ultimate ecosystem engineers’ who moderate the environment for their benefit. For at least the last few hundred years, human ingenuity, access to massive stocks of fossil fuels, and technological development have driven facilitation whereby increasing human abundance has promoted higher population growth rates. However, this positive relationship broke down during the 1950s, and by 1962, the global human population entered a phase where the growth rate consistently declined as population increased. The onset of this negative phase occurred 8 years before a global biocapacity deficit began in 1970. The onset of the negative phase also varies regionally, with the lowest-income and highest fertility regions entering this phase later than higher-income regions. A Ricker logistic model fitted to the negative phase predicts that the global population could reach 11.7–12.4 billion people between 2067 and 2076.

Climate models simulate a wide range of 21st century warming for a given forcing scenario. Constraining this uncertainty is a central challenge in climate science because of its implications for climate policy and adaptation. The Transient Climate Response (TCR) is a key idealized metric used to quantify future warming in response to an exponentially increasing CO2 concentration. Climate models span a range of 1.3–3 K for TCR. In attempts to constrain this range, emergent constraints on TCR based on historical temperature trends consistently pointed towards TCR values at the lower end of the range of models. However, recent evidence from trends in the short-wave and long-wave components of Earth's energy imbalance (EEI) at the top-of-atmosphere suggests that models with higher TCR lie closer to the observed EEI trends. Here, we reconcile this discrepancy and provide a revised range for TCR of 1.9–2.6 K. Using a statistical variability-filtering approach, we show that previous temperature-based constraints we

The concepts of Green Growth and Degrowth represent two major narratives in the public and academic debate on socio-ecological transformation. . . Using a comparative analysis of the two research fields, we confirm several findings from previous reviews, including that Green Growth research is highly policy oriented, focuses on practical implementation and builds on empirical research methods, while Degrowth research is highly theory-driven, focuses on the analysis of complex human-nature interrelationships and builds on a sound theoretical and conceptual foundation. Our analysis further reveals that Green Growth and Degrowth are two rather isolated fields of research with little exchange and mutual reference on related topics. However, the topic of social change and transition represents an intersecting and promising future research area. . . .

Climate models simulate a wide range of 21st century warming for a given forcing scenario. Constraining this uncertainty is a central challenge in climate science because of its implications for climate policy and adaptation. The transient climate response (TCR) is a key idealized metric used to quantify future warming in response to an exponentially increasing CO2 concentration. Climate models span a range of 1.3–3 K for TCR. In attempts to constrain this range, emergent constraints on TCR based on historical temperature trends consistently pointed toward TCR values at the lower end of the range of models. However, recent evidence from trends in the short-wave and long-wave components of Earth's energy imbalance (EEI) at the top-of-atmosphere suggests that models with higher TCR lie closer to the observed EEI trends. Here, we reconcile this discrepancy and provide a revised range for TCR of 1.9–2.6 K. Using a statistical variability-filtering approach, we show that previous temperature-based constraints wer

Members of parliament have demanded full publication of an explosive report by the UK’s spy leaders that found the collapse of ecosystems overseas would have catastrophic consequences for the UK’s national security, warning that the UK has “no future” if the findings are not urgently acted on.

Current energy projections often envision an expansion of nuclear capacities to decarbonize future energy systems. However, this contrasts with the historic and current status of the nuclear industry, marked by techno-economic challenges for both light-water and non-light-water reactor technologies. Regardless, projections of strong nuclear growth have persisted since the 1970s. This paper investigates the “nuclear energy paradox” which shows the recurring divergence between historical projections and actual developments. A data compilation of long-term energy projections from international organizations such as the IAEA and the IEA as well as energy system models like GCAM and MESSAGE, as used in the IPCC, reveal a recurring pattern of high-growth projections for nuclear power. Such projections often rest on techno-economic assumptions such as substantial cost reductions. We propose the concept of nuclear imaginaries to show that these assumptions are embedded into techno-economic visions of nuclear power de

Scenarios serve as a critical tool in climate change analysis, enabling the exploration of future evolution of the climate system, climate impacts, and the human system (including mitigation and adaptation actions). This paper describes the scenario framework for ScenarioMIP as part of CMIP7. The design process has involved various rounds of interaction with the research community and user groups at large. The proposal covers a set of scenarios exploring high levels of climate change (to explore high-end climate risks), medium levels of climate change (anchored to current policy), and low levels of climate change (aligned with current international agreements). These scenarios follow very different trajectories in terms of emissions, with some likely to experience peaks and subsequent declines in greenhouse gas concentrations in this century. An important innovation is that most scenarios are intended to be run, if possible, in emission-driven mode, providing a better representation of the Earth system uncert

Climate models show considerable discrepancies in their future projections around the Atlantic, mainly due to uncertainties in the fate of the Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation (AMOC). Climate models suggest a reduction in AMOC strength of 32 ± 37% by 2100 (90% probability, Shared Socioeconomic Pathways 2-4.5 scenario, Coupled Model Intercomparison Project Phase 6). To refine this estimate and reduce its uncertainty, we use four different observational constraint methods. The best one, which provides the lowest leave-one-out error, integrates a large set of observable variables using ridge-regularized linear regression—a method unusual in climate science. It gives an estimate of the AMOC slowdown of 51 ± 8% (90% probability), i.e., a weakening ∼ 60% stronger than suggested by the multimodel mean. This refinement mainly results from correcting a bias in South Atlantic surface salinity, consistent with recent studies emphasizing its role in the proximity to an AMOC tipping point. This more substantial

Climate change is causing measurable harm globally1,2. Political and legal efforts seek to link these damages with specific emissions, including in discussions of loss and damage (L&D)3,4; however, no quantitative definition of L&D exists5,6, nor is there a framework to link past and future emissions from specific sources to monetized, location-specific damages. Here we develop such a framework, which is integrated with recent efforts to estimate the social cost of carbon7. Using empirical estimates of the non-linear relationship between temperature and aggregate economic output, we show that future damages from past emissions—one component of L&D—are at least an order of magnitude larger than historical damages from the same emissions. For instance, one tonne of CO2 emitted in 1990 caused US$180 in discounted global damages by 2020 ($40–530) and will cause an additional $1,840 through 2100 ($500–5,700). Thus, settling debts for past damages will not settle debts for past emissions. In other illustrative esti

Le philosophe de l'environnement Rupert Read dit à Ella Whelan la panéliste Moral Maze pourquoi nous ne pourrons peut-être plus profiter du même niveau de vie pour le bien de la planète et des générations futures.

Residents report terror of smoke-filled city, from potentially toxic rain, air and water to food scarcity and difficulty of escape

By the end of this century, parts of Africa could face heatwaves for 250-300 days a year, which will make it difficult for people to survive.

Climate change is making it challenging to identify future host cities.

The Global Environment Outlook, Seventh Edition: A Future We Choose, the product of 287 multi-disciplinary scientists from 82 countries, is the most comprehensive scientific assessment of the global environment ever carried out.

US demand to own Greenland leaves little scope for compromise, and forcing the issue would entail end of Nato Greenland, with a population of fewer than 57,000, might not seem to be the territory on which the future of the relationship between Europe and the US, the viability of Nato as the world’s most successful defence alliance, or even the fractured relations between the UK and Europe would be determined. But battlefields are sometimes the product of chance, rather than choice. It now feels as if Donald Trump’s threat to impose 10% tariffs on eight fellow Nato states for sending troops last week to support Greenland’s sovereignty may be one of those clarifying moments in which Europe had no option. Successive European leaders condemned Trump’s blackmail and intimidation on Sunday and they sounded as if they meant it.

We are living in a time of polycrisis. If you feel trapped – you’re not alone. I hadn’t fully grasped how the idea of a better future sustained me – now I, like many others, find it difficult to be productive

I always say that models are not predictions; they are qualitative illustrations of what the future could be. But as the future gets closer to the present, models can start being seen as predictive tools. It is the weather/climate dichotomy, so aptly exploited to confuse matters by politically minded people in the discussion about climate. Right now, we are getting close to the point that we could forecast a collapse in the same way as we can forecast the trajectory of a tropical storm. So, you remember how “The Limits to Growth” generated a long term forecast in 1972. Here it is

Collapse has historically benefited the 99%. […] That’s the amazing conclusion of Luke Kemp, author of Goliath’s Curse: The History and Future of Societal Collapse.  Luke is a research associate at the Centre for the Study of Existential Risk at the University of Cambridge, and has spent the past five years studying the collapse of civilisations throughout history. He joins me to explain his research, detailing the difference between complex, collective civilisations and what he calls “Goliaths”, massive centralising forces by which a small group of individuals extract wealth from the rest through domination and the threat of violence. Today, he says, we live in a global Goliath.

We are hurtling toward climate chaos. The planet's vital signs are flashing red. The consequences of human-driven alterations of the climate are no longer future threats but are here now. This unfolding emergency stems from failed foresight, political inaction, unsustainable economic systems, and misinformation. Almost every corner of the biosphere is reeling from intensifying heat, storms, floods, droughts, or fires. The window to prevent the worst outcomes is rapidly closing. In early 2025, the World Meteorological Organization reported that 2024 was the hottest year on record (WMO 2025a). This was likely hotter than the peak of the last interglacial, roughly 125,000 years ago (Gulev et al. 2021, Kaufman and McKay 2022). Rising levels of greenhouse gases remain the driving force behind this escalation. These recent developments emphasize the extreme insufficiency of global efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and mark the beginning of a grim new chapter for life on Earth.

22 of the planet’s 34 vital signs are at record levels, with many of them continuing to trend sharply in the wrong direction. This is the message of the sixth issue of the annual “State of the climate” report. The report was prepared by an international coalition with contribution from the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research (PIK) and led by Oregon State University scientists. Published today in BioScience, it cites global data from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in proposing “high-impact” strategies.