English references

We can’t know how long the war in the Middle East will last. Nor can we know who will “win” it, and in which terms. What we know is that the destruction already wreaked on things and people is immense, and it keeps escalating. The longer the war, the bleaker their perspectives in a region already plagued by all sorts of problems, including drought, soil degradation, ecosystem damage, scarce agricultural resources, declining fertility rates, and more.

Climate change is causing measurable harm globally1,2. Political and legal efforts seek to link these damages with specific emissions, including in discussions of loss and damage (L&D)3,4; however, no quantitative definition of L&D exists5,6, nor is there a framework to link past and future emissions from specific sources to monetized, location-specific damages. Here we develop such a framework, which is integrated with recent efforts to estimate the social cost of carbon7. Using empirical estimates of the non-linear relationship between temperature and aggregate economic output, we show that future damages from past emissions—one component of L&D—are at least an order of magnitude larger than historical damages from the same emissions. For instance, one tonne of CO2 emitted in 1990 caused US$180 in discounted global damages by 2020 ($40–530) and will cause an additional $1,840 through 2100 ($500–5,700). Thus, settling debts for past damages will not settle debts for past emissions. In other illustrative esti

Neonicotinoid insecticides are a major driver of pollinator decline. Due to their persistence and mobility in soil, they can contaminate non-target vegetation through runoff or dust, reaching pollinator resources. However, predicting soil contamination is challenging, especially where pesticide use data is lacking. This study assessed the potential of using proxies such as cropping history and landscape structure to predict neonicotinoid content in soils. We analyzed seven neonicotinoids in 86 sites in agricultural landscapes of Belgium.

The decline in the health of nature around the world poses a threat to the UK's security and prosperity, an intelligence committee has concluded in a long-awaited report. The document warns of "cascading risks" from the degradation of some of the planet's most important ecosystems, including conflict, migration and increased competition for resources.

“Water crisis” has become the default label for almost any episode of water stress, from short-lived droughts to decades-long overuse of rivers and aquifers. Yet in many regions of the world, water problems no longer resemble a crisis in the conventional sense. They represent a post-crisis failure state in which human–water systems have exceeded their hydrological carrying capacities, and societies have spent beyond their sustainable hydrological budgets for so long that critical water assets are depleted, some ecosystem damages are irreversible on human time scales, and a return to “normal” is infeasible even with prohibitive economic, social, and environmental costs.

US demand to own Greenland leaves little scope for compromise, and forcing the issue would entail end of Nato Greenland, with a population of fewer than 57,000, might not seem to be the territory on which the future of the relationship between Europe and the US, the viability of Nato as the world’s most successful defence alliance, or even the fractured relations between the UK and Europe would be determined. But battlefields are sometimes the product of chance, rather than choice. It now feels as if Donald Trump’s threat to impose 10% tariffs on eight fellow Nato states for sending troops last week to support Greenland’s sovereignty may be one of those clarifying moments in which Europe had no option. Successive European leaders condemned Trump’s blackmail and intimidation on Sunday and they sounded as if they meant it.

Data group forecasts deficit of 10mn tonnes by 2040, equivalent to nearly one-third of current global demand

Much attention today focuses on uncertainties affecting the future evolution of oil and natural gas demand, with less consideration given to how the supply picture could develop. However, understanding decline rates – the annual rate at which production declines from existing oil and gas fields – is crucial for assessing the outlook for oil and gas supply and, by extension, for market balances. The International Energy Agency (IEA) has long examined this issue, and a detailed understanding of decline rates is at the heart of IEA modelling and analysis, underpinning the insights provided by the scenarios in the World Energy Outlook. This new report – based on analysis of the production records of around 15 000 oil and gas fields around the world – explores the implications of accelerating decline rates, growing reliance on unconventional resources, and evolving project development patterns for the global oil and gas supply landscape, for energy security and for investment. It also provides regional insights

Critical minerals, which are essential for a range of energy technologies and for the broader economy, have become a major focus in global policy and trade discussions. Price volatility, supply chain bottlenecks and geopolitical concerns make the regular monitoring of their supply and demand extremely vital.

It is said that George W. Bush Jr. decided to invade Iraq in 2003 because he had read some papers on oil depletion by the Association for the Study of Peak Oil (ASPO). Of course, it may be just a legend, but I don’t see it as impossible, and perhaps not even improbable. Politicians make decisions on the basis of vague ideas, often on the spur of the moment, and in many cases making terrible mistakes. But they normally understand some of the critical elements that keep alive the system. For the US, the critical resource was, and still is, crude oil. So, it is possible that Bush thought that it was necessary to compensate for the decline of the US oil production by seizing the Iraqi resources. That didn’t necessarily imply to start a war, just like filling the tank of your car doesn’t imply shooting dead the service station operator. But that’s the way some people’s minds work.

Climate change will fuel contests—and maybe wars—for land and resources.

A new study finds that the mining and processing of the metal critical to EV batteries and renewable energy storage projects depletes and contaminates surface water, often in already vulnerable communities.

Sharp declines in critical mineral prices mask risks of future supply strains as energy transitions advance - News from the International Energy Agency

The rapid growth of clean energy technologies is driving a rising demand for critical minerals. In 2022 at the 15th Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity (COP15), seven major economies formed an alliance to enhance the sustainability of mining these essential decarbonization minerals. However, there is a scarcity of studies assessing the threat of mining to global biodiversity. By integrating a global mining dataset with great ape density distribution, we estimated the number of African great apes that spatially coincided with industrial mining projects. We show that up to one-third of Africa’s great ape population faces mining-related risks. In West Africa in particular, numerous mining areas overlap with fragmented ape habitats, often in high-density ape regions. For 97% of mining areas, no ape survey data are available, underscoring the importance of increased accessibility to environmental data within the mining sector to facilitate research into the complex interactions betw

Evidence shows a continuing increase in the frequency and severity of global heatwaves1,2, raising concerns about the future impacts of climate change and the associated socioeconomic costs3,4. Here we develop a disaster footprint analytical framework by integrating climate, epidemiological and hybrid input–output and computable general equilibrium global trade models to estimate the midcentury socioeconomic impacts of heat stress. We consider health costs related to heat exposure, the value of heat-induced labour productivity loss and indirect losses due to economic disruptions cascading through supply chains. Here we show that the global annual incremental gross domestic product loss increases exponentially from 0.03 ± 0.01 (SSP 245)–0.05 ± 0.03 (SSP 585) percentage points during 2030–2040 to 0.05 ± 0.01–0.15 ± 0.04 percentage points during 2050–2060. By 2060, the expected global economic losses reach a total of 0.6–4.6% with losses attributed to health loss (37–45%), labour productivity loss (18–37%) and i

All local communities affected by mining projects should have the right to have a say on whether mining activities will start or continue in their backyard. This belief in community involvement in political, economic, and environmental decision-making is epitomised in a Right to Say No (RTSN), which is the inalienable and collective right of a community to say no (or yes) to extractive projects on the territories/lands they are living within. Currently, there is no real ‘Right’ to Say No outside of iterations of the indigenous right to free, prior and informed consent (FPIC) — it is a right we are asserting, not something we can yet claim. This toolbox will elaborate on the rights local communities already have and those rights that still need to be recognised and enforced, to establish a Right to Say No.

ELDORADO - The Struggle for Skouries is an urgent documentary chronicling the struggle against environmental destruction through high-risk gold mining at Europe's largest mining project located in Northern Greece. Chronicling the resistance against high-risk gold extraction and the criminalization of the anti-mining movement by the Greek government, it is an urgent document of neoliberal ideals and human rights abuses playing out in one of the most crisis-ridden countries of Europe. Find out more here: www.eldorado-documentary.com

New data on WRI's Aqueduct platform ranks the world's most water-stressed countries. One-quarter of the global population regularly use up their entire water supply.

Flash drought, characterized by unusually rapid drying, can have substantial impact on many socioeconomic sectors, particularly agriculture. However, potential changes to flash drought risk in a warming climate remain unknown. In this study, projected changes in flash drought frequency and cropland risk from flash drought are quantified using global climate model simulations. We find that flash drought occurrence is expected to increase globally among all scenarios, with the sharpest increases seen in scenarios with higher radiative forcing and greater fossil fuel usage. Flash drought risk over cropland is expected to increase globally, with the largest increases projected across North America (change in annual risk from 32% in 2015 to 49% in 2100) and Europe (32% to 53%) in the most extreme emissions scenario. Following low-end and medium scenarios compared to high-end scenarios indicates a notable reduction in annual flash drought risk over cropland. Flash droughts are projected to become more frequent unde

Rivers are a major source of plastic waste in the oceans. We estimate that 1000 rivers, are accountable for nearly 80% of global annual riverine plastic emissions, which range between 0.8 – 2.7 million metric tons per year, with small urban rivers amongst the most polluting.